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Abstract 
TCP/IP fingerprinting is a common technique used to detect unique network stack characteristics of an 
Operating System (OS). Its usage for network compromise is renowned for performing host discovery and in 
aiding the blackhat to determine a tailored exploit of detected OSs. The honeyd honeynet is able to 
countermeasure blackhats utilising TCP/IP fingerprinting via host device emulation on a virtual network. 
Honeyd allows the creation of host personalities that respond to network stack fingerprinting as a real 
network would. The nature of this technique however, has shown to provide inconsistent and unreliable 
results when performed over wired and wireless network mediums. This paper presents ongoing research 
into the TCP/IP fingerprinting capabilities of the popular host discovery tool Network Mapper (NMAP) on 
the honeyd honeynet. The forensic analysis of raw packet-captures allowed the researcher to identify 
differences in the modus operandi and outcomes of fingerprinting over the two mediums. The results of this 
exploratory study show the process of discovery to uncover how TCP/IP fingerprinting with NMAP and 
honeyd needs to be tested for effective network countermeasure. 
Keywords 
TCP/IP fingerprinting, NMAP fingerprint, NMAP signatures, honeyd honeypot  
INTRODUCTION 
TCP/IP fingerprinting is a scanning technique that can be used by network administrators to assess their 
network in addition to blackhats identifying victims to exploit. The fingerprinting technique itself involves 
determining any unique differences between Operating Systems (OS) and distinguishing the feature in 
network packets so that it may be probed (Yarochkin, 1997). An OS fingerprint should have a distinctive 
identification, that when recognised, reveals the platform name and version such as Microsoft Windows XP 
SP2. 
Network Mapper (NMAP) (Yarochkin, 2004c) is a tool that contains a database of known and previously 
tested fingerprints by the online security community. Each fingerprint belongs to a specific OS platform that 
is assigned a signature, which usually is identical to the actual OS name. The fingerprints themselves show 
a series of TCP/IP probing packet sequences that are sent from the probing OS to the network stack of the 
probed OS. Probing packets contain flag settings, which are changed according to the type of probe that is 
sent. There is an extensive list of probes that may be sent by NMAP, mostly malformed TCP/IP packets, 
which aids a clandestine approach to conducting scans. 
NMAP is primarily used to determine the OS running on a selected IP address. This exercise is commonly 
referred to as host discovery and NMAP performs this through sending probing packets to the specified 
ports on the OS of the target IP selected. The host name that is discovered should correspond to a signature 
in the NMAP database if it is known. NMAP can detect the types of services and applications that are 
running on the ports that it scans. Consequently, a host discovery technique that may be fine-tuned using a 
variety of probes aids to paint a full picture of the OS that is running on the IP of a target (Wolfgang, 2002). 
As the tool is freely downloadable from the World Wide Web (WWW) and highly flexible in its use, it has 
become a popular choice for administrators to use in addition to blackhats of various levels of sophistication 
(Conry-Murray, 2003; Spitzner, 2003; Yarochkin, 1997, 2002). 
The fingerprints in NMAP’s database are tested and contributed by the security community, and maintained 
by the original author Fyodor Yarochkin. When they are submitted to the database, they are tested by 
several parties on unknown machines and OSs. A limitation that may arise is that the fingerprint may only 
be effective for host discovery when performed from a specific platform OS or OSs. Consequently, when a 
newly released OS is used to perform TCP/ IP fingerprinting, the results may not be consistently the same. 
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One method for testing if NMAP can effectively fingerprint all the OS signatures in it’s database is by 
configuring the honeyd (Provos, 2005) honeynet with all the signatures. A honeypot or honeynet is any 
digital entity which behaves as a genuine resource when probed or attacked (Spitzner, 2003; The Honeynet 
Project, 2004). The purpose of a honeypot or a honeynet, which is a network of honeypots, is to employ the 
characteristics of the resource it is mimicking to deceive the blackhat. Honeyd is a daemon, which creates 
host devices or a virtual network of devices by emulating lower layer protocols such as TCP, IP, UDP, and 
ICMP as examples, in addition to upper-layer protocols including FTP, TELNET, and HTTP as part of an 
OS’s personality.  
Honeyd was designed to countermeasure NMAP’s fingerprinting ability, utilised by blackhats, by 
employing its own techniques against itself. The virtual hosts and networks are configured through 
templates that assign NMAP signatures to an assigned IP address. Honeyd can create many thousands of 
hosts, with a personality that includes services, applications, and protocol instructions for each or any 
specific port. For example, ports on a host may be configured to accept, drop or tarpit (prolong a connection 
for an inevitable time) connection attempts initiated by the probing packets sent by the blackhat. 
When a blackhat sends probing packets from NMAP to honeyd they may believe they are attacking a real 
network of OSs because the responses that honeyd generates are identical to a real OS. This deceptive 
capability may act as a network countermeasure for administrators attempting to prevent blackhats from 
reaching the corporate network. In addition to this, the honeyd honeynet may act as a decoy to distract the 
blackhat while the administrator monitors their methods and identifies the goal of their endeavour. 
However, the effectiveness of honeyd to deceive network attackers is limited to its ability to mimic the 
network stack of its configured hosts.  
PREVIOUS STUDIES USING HONEYD TO COUNTERMEASURE NETWORK 
ATTACK 
In addition to the literature on the deceptive capabilities of honeyd and honeynets for decoying blackhats 
from genuine systems and monitoring their activities when in the honeynet, studies by Gupta (2003) 
presented results on the effectiveness of using honeyd as a network countermeasure. At the time, the 
honeynet utilised a Linux Redhat 7.3 installation and honeyd version 0.4a with subsequent upgrade to 0.5a 
to construct the deceptive network that was tested by voluntary participants of the study with network 
attacking skills.  
Cyclical experiments were conducted where the honeynet was subject to network penetration testing by 
voluntary blackhat participants, and then upon feedback the honeynet was reconfigured to appear and 
behave more securely. Three rounds of testing were conducted. The blackhats concluded that the initial 
honeynet appeared to be unsecured and weakly configured and network logging showed high levels of 
network (TCP, ICMP, UDP) traffic. By the third round, the blackhats reported that the network appeared to 
be a well-configured corporate implementation allowing controlled levels of network traffic. These results 
indicated that the honeyd was effective in deceiving the blackhat while network logging allowed the 
researcher to monitor their activities while in the honeynet. 
Subsequent research by Valli (2003) investigated how honeyd could be improved to deceive the blackhat. It 
was deduced that the TCP/IP fingerprinting capabilities of NMAP against honeyd was one of the crucial 
factors contributing to the blackhat’s deception. Also using Linux Redhat 7.3 as the base testing OS and the 
then current honeyd version of 0.7a, Valli tested all possible NMAP signatures to determine which could be 
fingerprinted across five separate scan-types over a wired medium. The results showed that of the possible 
704 signatures, only 152 could effectively fingerprint. 
The study utilised five of NMAP’s probes, SYN, FIN, UDP, NULL, and XMAS, which are explained as 
follows. The Synchronise (SYN) flag set in a packet that is usually sent to initiate a TCP connection. The 
Finish (FIN) flag set in a packet is sent to tear down or terminate a TCP connection. The User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) utilises a flag set for a connectionless packet. The Null (NULL) flag has no flags enabled in 
the packet; and the Christmas Tree (XMAS) flag enables a combination of the FIN, Urgent Pointer (URG) 
and PUSH flags in a TCP packet. The URG flag indicates the packet requires urgent attention and is usually 
for TELNET connections. The PUSH flag indicates not to wait before sending data. 
Each of the probes form part of a scan-type, which implements the flag settings in a series of packets sent to 
a target machine. NMAP interprets the response given by it’s target. A sophisticated user of NMAP may 
identify with the types of responses that are produced from the scans. For example, a NULL scan-type that 
yields a Reset (RST) response is most likely a Microsoft Windows OS (Yarochkin, 2004b).  
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Of the 152 successful fingerprints, several were chosen to configure a wireless enabled honeynet using 
honeyd version 0.8b on a Linux Mandrake 9.0 installation (Yek, 2003). The results indicated that the OS 
signatures that could be previously fingerprinted over the wired medium did not fingerprint consistently or 
reliability over the wireless medium (Yek, 2004). At the time, the network logging facilities afforded by 
honeyd proved to be lacking in verbosity to identify the causes of fingerprint failure. The fingerprinting 
tools NMAP and Nessus (Deraison, 2005) generated reports on the outcomes of scans and vulnerability 
assessment. 
While NMAP could not effectively scan all the OS signatures in honeyd, some could be fingerprinted across 
the five scan-types previously used by Valli (2003). The network vulnerability assessments performed by 
Nessus were mostly able to provide at least one significant weakness for a potential blackhat to exploit. The 
overall results showed that the network would not be effective in deceiving a blackhat and countermeasure 
network fingerprinting techniques. This study indicated that the TCP/IP fingerprinting of NMAP required 
further examination into the causes of failure particularly over the wireless medium and to determine a 
method for effective testing. 
METHOD 
In this research, the honeynet was an Athlon 1.5 GHz desktop machine with a Wireless Network Interface 
Card (WNIC) extending an antenna for 802.11b wireless transmission and reception. Additionally, a NIC 
allowed for a Category 5 (CAT-5) wired cable to be attached. The exploratory testing was conducted in a 
university laboratory. 
A minimal installation of Linux Mandrake 10.1 was set up as the base OS for running honeyd version 1.0 
(Provos, 2005) – the latest release. Mandrake 10.1 was the latest, robust version released at the time of 
configuration. The honeyd had a minimal installation for a reduced number of unneeded utilities, programs, 
and software to be running in the background of the honeynet, mitigating insecure programs and allowing 
greater processing power for honeyd to run. The attack machine had the same base OS, except a full 
installation including NMAP v.3.55 to allow the machine to run uninhibited. The attack machine was a 
Pentium III, 800 MHz IBM Thinkpad Laptop which had inbuilt 802.11b wireless capability, which 
contained a Hermes chipset to support promiscuous packet capture. The inbuilt card was later replaced (due 
to failure) with an Orinoco 802.11b Direct Sequence (DS) Peripheral Connect (PC) card, which operated in 
the same promiscuous manner. 
The process for testing the TCP/IP fingerprinting was as follows. The NMAP database of OS signatures 
were extracted as a text file and configured as hosts in the honeyd templates. The current version of NMAP 
contained 988 OS signatures. The hosts imported into the honeyd templates were named host0001 to 
host0988. These names held no significance other than representing a sequential numerical order. To 
spread out the hosts over a realistic network of addresses, three B class network addresses were used, which 
were 172.16.1.1 – 254, 172.16.2.1 – 254, and 172.16.23.1 – 226.  
The honeynet machine was given an IP address of 192.168.1.1 on the eth1 interface and the attack 
machine was given an IP address of 192.168.1.2 on it’s eth1 interface. The first tests were conducted over 
a wired medium using a cross over cable connecting the two machines directly to eliminate any interference 
from other networked devices. 
On the initial start-up of honeyd with all the hosts loaded, six errors were reported indicating that the six 
signatures had inaccuracies, which honeyd could not recognise. These signatures were deleted from honeyd 
and honeyd was restarted without error. When honeyd was restarted successfully, the attack machine 
initiated the first round of NMAP scanning to determine host name resolution via TCP/IP fingerprinting 
over the wired medium, followed by the wireless medium. When the wireless scans were conducted, the 
interfaces were changed from eth0 to wlan0 on the honeynet and the attack machines. No other changes 
were made to the machines to mitigate the risk of confounding variables affecting the scanning results. 
RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND OF SCANNING NMAP  
For reliability, each scan-type was conducted five times on each IP address. Results showed that if a scan-
type could fingerprint the OS once, it would do so on the remaining four occasions. The version of NMAP 
in use attributed percentage guesses for each OS that it found and ordered them alphabetically. Therefore, 
several OSs could be guessed, where one or more could be assigned the highest percentage and numerous 
others were assigned a lower percentage. The OS guess was counted as correct if the guess was one of the 
highest percentage guesses listed. Figure 1 shows the generated output of an NMAP scan, which found 
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several OS matches in it’s fingerprint of 172.16.0.7. The highest percentage score of 90% for the 3Com 
Netbuilder Remote Office 222 router was taken as a correct guess. 
 
Warning:  OS detection will be MUCH less reliable 
because we did not find at least 1 open and 1 closed 
TCP port 
Interesting ports on 172.16.0.7: 
PORT      STATE SERVICE 
1/tcp     open  tcpmux 
2/tcp     open  compressnet 
3/tcp     open  compressnet 
... 
... 
... 
61440/tcp open  netprowler-manager2 
61441/tcp open  netprowler-sensor 
65301/tcp open  pcanywhere 
Device type: router|WAP|general purpose|switch 
 
Running (JUST GUESSING) : 3Com embedded (90%), Compaq 
embedded (86%), Netgear embedded (86%), Data General 
AOS/VS (85%) 
 
Aggressive OS guesses: 3Com Netbuilder Remote Office 
222 router (90%), 3Com Netbuilder Remote Office 222 
(ESPL-310), Version 10.1 (SW/NBRO-AB,10.1) (90%), 3Com 
Netbuilder II Router Ver 11.4.0.51 (88%), 3Com 
NetBuilder-II, OS version SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27 (87%), 
WAP: Compaq iPAQ Connection Point or Netgear MR814 
(86%), AOS/VS on a Data General mainframe (85%), 3Com 
SuperStack II switch SW/NBSI-CF,11.1.0.00S38 (85%) 
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-
ideal). 
 
Figure 1 – example NMAP output on scan 
 
Out of the 982 possible OSs in honeyd, NMAP could only resolve six of the signatures and therefore, only 
six were effectively fingerprinted, which is shown in Table 1. In Table 1, the hostname and the IP addresses 
do not hold significance towards the fingerprinting result. This initial round of scanning was primarily 
concerned with determining which OS signatures used on honeyd could be fingerprinted by NMAP 
consistently and reliably over the wired and wireless mediums. 
 
Table 1 - NMAP signatures that fingerprinted across all scan-types 
 
HOSTNAME IP NMAP SIGNATURE 
host0002 172.16.0.2 3Com Access Builder 4000 Switch 
host0057 172.16.0.57 Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer 
host0070 172.16.0.70 Apple Mac OS 8.5.1 (Appleshare IP 6.0) 
host0186 172.16.0.186 Cisco 7206 running IOS 11.1(24) 
host0341 172.16.1.87 
DSL Router: Flowpoint 144/22XX v3.0.8 
or SpeedStream 5851 v4.0.5.1 
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host0855 172.16.3.93 SCO Open Desktop 2.0 
 
 
Upon assessing the remaining fingerprint results, 18 more signatures were fingerprinted at least four or 
more times over the five scan-types conducted, which is shown in Table 2. The wired and wireless scores 
out of five indicate the number of scan-types were successful. host0001, with signature 3Com / USR 
TotalSwitch Firmware: 02.02.00R was successfully fingerprinted over three scan-types over the 
wire and two scan-types over the wireless medium. For the purpose of this reporting, the type of scan-type 
did not matter, as the goal was to fingerprint across all scan-types. However, it was found the SYN scans 
were the most successful. 
TABLE 2 - NMAP signatures that fingerprinted four or more times across all scan-types 
HOST 
NAME 
IP NMAP SIGNARURE 
W
IR
E
D
 
/5
 
W
IR
E
L
E
S
S
 /
5
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
/1
0
 
host0001 172.16.0.1 
3Com / USR TotalSwitch 
Firmware: 02.02.00R 
3 2 5 
host0009 172.16.0.9 
3Com NetBuilder-II, OS version 
SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27 
5 4 9 
host0055 172.16.0.55 
Apple Color LaserWriter 12/660 PS 
(Model No. M3036) 
5 4 9 
host0056 172.16.0.56 
Apple Color LaserWriter 600 
Printer 
5 4 9 
host0091 172.16.0.91 
Asante FriendlyNet FR3004 Series 
Internet Hub 
5 4 9 
host0185 172.16.0.185 Cisco 7206 router (IOS 11.1(17) 5 4 9 
host0258 172.16.1.4 
Compatible Systems (RISC Router, 
IntraPort) 
5 4 9 
host0325 172.16.1.71 
D-Link 704P Broadband Gateway 
or DI-713P WAP 
3 2 5 
host0495 172.16.1.241 IBM MVS 5 2 7 
host0497 172.16.1.243 IBM MVS TCP/IP TCPMVS 3.2 5 3 8 
host0505 172.16.1.251 IBM OS/390 V5R0M0 5 4 9 
host0541 172.16.2.33 
Lantronix EPS2 print server 
Version V3.5/2(970721) 
5 4 9 
host0558 172.16.2.50 
Linksys BEFW11S4 WAP or 
BEFSR41 router 
4 1 5 
host0681 172.16.2.173 Microsoft Windows Server 2003 1 3 4 
host0717 172.16.2.209 
MultiTech CommPlete Controller 
(terminal server) 
5 4 9 
host0805 172.16.3.43 OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86) 5 1 6 
host0910 172.16.3.148 Speedstream 5871 DSL router 5 1 6 
host0948 172.16.3.186 Toshiba TR650 ISDN Router 5 4 9 
 
At this point of testing, the hard disk on the honeyd honeynet failed and a reinstall was required. The new 
honeyd that was configured remained as a Linux Mandrake 10.1 installation to maintain consistency; 
however, the NMAP signatures had been updated to include over a 1000 in total, which was previously at 
988. The attack machine was also modified as the Auditor Security Collection distribution version 200605-
02-no-ipw2100 which was released and tested by Valli (personal communication, September 5, 2005) to 
verify the reliability of the wireless security tools that were part of the distribution OS. 
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Further to the changes in the honeynet and attack machine, it was also decided that the testing environment 
was unsuitable in a laboratory that was located within an 802.11b wireless saturated location of the 
university. Using AiroPeek v.2.0, packet captures of the wireless traffic traversing the attack machine and 
honeynet showed a high number of corrupted packets. TCPdump (Network Research Group, 2004) was 
used to gather raw network packet captures of the wired and wireless traffic and was viewed through the 
network packet analyser Ethereal (Combs, 2004). The comparison between a wired Ethernet header packet 
and wireless header packet is shown in Figure 2 and indicates no significant errors at the TCP/IP level of 
network packets. The packets shown in Figure 2 are a reflection of the results of TCPdump and it was 
deduced that the errors occurring in the TCP/IP fingerprinting might have been at the lower network levels 
of the physical and data link. 
The new proposed solution was a faraday cage environment, in which a decommissioned stainless steel 
cool-room was experimented with; however, the temperature became too hot with the equipment running 
and there was no HVAC to circulate the air. The subsequent decision was to build a faraday cage with 
inbuilt fans to regulate the heat and temperatures by circulating air out of the cage. A metal cabinet was 
utilised, and holes where drilled to allow for minimal cabling and a fan at the top and bottom of the back 
wall. The honeynet and packet capture machines were moved into the faraday cage and the attacking laptop 
sat on top. When the cage was closed, it was able to keep out external 802.11b wireless traffic while the 
antenna reception and transmission was unaffected inside the cage. 
 
Source Port 
61493 
Destination Port 
http (80) 
Sequence Number 
0 
Acknowledgement Number 
0 
Length 
20 
Unused 
Flags 
0x0010 
ACK 
Window 
Size 
3072 
Checksum 
0x6b71 (correct) 
 
Urgent Pointer 
Not set 
 
Type 
 
Length 
 
Data 
 
 
 
Wired TCP header packet from the 
attack machine – frame# 13 
Version 
4 
Header 
Length 
20 
Type of 
Service 
Differentiated 
service field 
Total 
Length 
40 
Identification 
0x911a (37146) 
Flags 
0x00 
Fragment 
Offset 
0 
Time to 
Live 
46 
Protocol 
TCP 
(0x06) 
Header Checksum 
0x8dfa (correct) 
Source IP Address 
192.168.1.2 
Destination IP Address 
172.16.0.1 
Options (if any) 
 
Wireless IP header packet from the 
attack machine – frame# 13 
 
Figure 2 Comparison of a wired and 
wireless network packet 
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Several benefits were found when the NMAP scans were retested inside the faraday cage. Firstly, none of the scans took 
more than one to two minutes to complete, whereas prior to testing in the cage, some wireless scans took up to 60 
hours. It was deduced that the attack machine might have been performing a Denial of Service (DoS) onto the honeynet. 
Network packets may have been lost in transmission or bits in the packets may have changed due to the wide area 
exposed to the wireless network packets. High numbers of corrupted packets were detected by AiroPeek to support this 
theory. 
Additionally, the shorter scan times could be attributed to the faraday cage negating the outside wireless transmissions 
of the university’s wireless Local Area Network (LAN). Another significant difference was the upgrade of NMAP as 
part of using the Auditor distribution OS as the attack machine. NMAP version 3.75 was pre-installed on Auditor and 
the subsequent changes included no percentage scores attributed to OS guesses. NMAP now reported all the OSs that it 
guessed as most likely and did not report on possible other guesses. These OSs were also organised in alphabetical 
order; therefore, if a guess was placed third in the list, it did not indicate it was a third guess. All the guesses had equal 
weighting. 
RESULTS OF THE SECOND ROUND OF SCANNING NMAP  
An odd result that occurred in this round of testing was that the original six OS signatures that fingerprinted 
successfully across all scan-types, did not succeed when tested again in the faraday cage. The 18 tentative OS signatures 
that tested either four times or more in the laboratory tested more successfully in the cage. Table 3 shows the results of 
the testing in the faraday cage. For this testing, all the redundant OS signatures were removed from honeyd, and only 
the signatures that were to be tested this time were included in the honeyd configuration file. Consequently, only 24 
signatures were incorporated as host01 to host24. The first six OS signatures were those that tested effectively 
during the first round of scanning. 
Table 3 – NMAP signatures tested in faraday cage 
 
HOST 
NAME  
IP NMAP OS SIGNATURE 
NUMBER 
CORRECT 
FINGER-PRINTS 
/5 
host01 172.16.0.1 3Com Access Builder 4000 Switch 5 
host02 172.16.0.2 Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer 5 
host03 172.16.0.3 Apple Mac OS 8.5.1 (Appleshare IP 6.0) 3 
host04 172.16.0.4 Cisco 7206 running IOS 11.1(24) 2 
host05 172.16.0.5 
DSL Router: Flowpoint 144/22XX v3.0.8 
or SpeedStream 5851 v4.0.5.1 
5 
host06 172.16.0.6 SCO Open Desktop 2.0 3 
host07 172.16.0.7 
3Com / USR TotalSwitch Firmware: 
02.02.00R 
0 
host08 172.16.0.8 
3Com NetBuilder-II, OS version 
SW/NB2M-BR-5.1.0.27 
5 
host09 172.16.0.9 
Apple Color LaserWriter 12/660 PS 
(Model No. M3036) 
5 
host10 172.16.0.10 Apple Color LaserWriter 600 Printer 5 
host11 172.16.0.11 
Asante FriendlyNet FR3004 Series 
Internet Hub 
2 
host12 172.16.0.12 Cisco 7206 router (IOS 11.1(17) 5 
host13 172.16.0.13 
Compatible Systems (RISC Router, 
IntraPort) 
5 
host14 172.16.0.14 
D-Link 704P Broadband Gateway or DI-
713P WAP 
2 
host15 172.16.0.15 IBM MVS 3 
host16 172.16.0.16 IBM MVS TCP/IP TCPMVS 3.2 2 
host17 172.16.0.17 IBM OS/390 V5R0M0 2 
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host18 172.16.0.18 
Lantronix EPS2 print server Version 
V3.5/2(970721) 
5 
host19 172.16.0.19 
Linksys BEFW11S4 WAP or BEFSR41 
router 
0 
host20 172.16.0.20 Microsoft Windows Server 2003 2 
host21 172.16.0.21 
MultiTech CommPlete Controller 
(terminal server) 
0 
host22 172.16.0.22 OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86) 5 
host23 172.16.0.23 Speedstream 5871 DSL router 5 
host24 172.16.0.24 Toshiba TR650 ISDN Router 2 
 
The results show that only three of the original six OS signatures fingerprinted effectively across all five scan-types 
conducted. Further testing of the additional 18 showed that eight of the signatures could now fingerprint across all the 
scan-types. These results firstly indicated that there was a variation with the NMAP fingerprinting because the first six 
should have fingerprinted effectively in the faraday if they could be fingerprinted in an open laboratory with high 
interference. 
The possible reasons for the discrepancy in results were that NMAP v.3.55 was used for the first round of scans and 
during the eight-month period between testing, NMAP v.3.75 was released and pre-installed on Auditor. With each 
upgrade of NMAP, changes and improvements are introduced that may modify the scanning results (Yarochkin, 2004a). 
This is due to changes in the scanning engine and sometimes, modifications to the fingerprints. This is the most likely 
reason that the results differed in the six original fingerprints. An additional possibility is that the Auditor OS was used 
as the base OS instead of Linux Mandrake 10.1, as was previously used. This difference is however, less likely to affect 
the outcomes as to the change in NMAP itself. 
The results that showed more effective results from the faraday testing, that is the remaining 18 OS signatures, indicated 
that the testing was also affected by the faraday because some previous signatures that could not fingerprint were 
fingerprinting successfully. The NMAP upgrade is also likely to be the reason for their testing success as the database 
of OS signatures and fingerprints were expanded and improvements to some scan were made (ibid, 2004a) 
From the now eleven available signatures that could fingerprint effectively, it was proposed to design a virtual network 
using these signatures to build up OS personalities on eleven network hosts. However, upon closer examination of the 
OS signatures, it was found that none was an Access Point (AP) and only the OpenBSD 3.0-STABLE (X86) 
signature could act as a server, and none were able to act as clients. Most of the signatures that could be fingerprinted 
were routers. Therefore, some additional testing was required so that a more believable network could be designed that 
included servers, clients, and an AP. 
RESULTS OF SUPPLEMENTARY NMAP SCANNING 
The researcher then perused the list of fingerprints for potential OS signatures that could be used to fill out a virtual 
network topology. Different OS signatures were chosen based on their believability for existing as part of a network. 
For the proposed virtual DMZ, various Solaris, IBM, AIX, FreeBSD and NetBSD fingerprints were tested across the 
five scan-types and from these, only FreeBSD and NetBSD could be successfully fingerprinted on all accounts. 
Therefore, these OSs were chosen for the DMZ where the personalities could later be incorporated with mail, ftp and 
http services. 
For client machines, various Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh desktop OSs were tested and only Macintosh 
signatures appeared to work. According to previous research results, Windows machines do not fingerprint when using 
XMAS, UDP and NULL scans over the wireless medium. This has been reported due to Windows responding in a RST 
for all these scan-types when no response should be the standard reaction. However, a Windows XP laptop with a 
centrino chip was borrowed and tested against NMAP to determine if it could be fingerprinted. The result was that 
NMAP was able to fingerprint the Windows laptop across all the scan-types and was able to guess the Windows XP OS 
correctly, but among some other OSs as well. 
Lastly, serval AP signatures were tested and it was found that a Cisco WGB350 802.11b WorkGroup Bridge 
OS signature could fingerprint across all the scan-types effectively. Table 4 shows the additional signatures that were 
added to the honeyd virtual network. 
 
Table 4 – Additional NMAP OS signatures 
 
 Proceedings of 3rd Australian Computer, Network & Information Forensics Conference                             Page 123 
HOST 
NAME 
IP NMAP OS SIGNATURES 
host25 172.16.0.25 Cisco WGB350 802.11b WorkGroup Bridge 
host26 172.16.0.26 FreeBSD 5.0-RELEASE 
host27 172.16.0.27 Apple Mac OS 7.1 
host28 172.16.0.28 NetBSD 1.6 
Host29 192.168.1.13 Windows XP SP2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Proposed honeyd network topology 
 
The proposed virtual network of host devices including Macintosh clients, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD servers and a 
mix of networking mechanisms including an AP is illustrated in Figure 3. The attack machine is also shown in the 
diagram as a laptop using the IP 192.168.1.12 connecting via it’s wireless antenna. This network will be tested with 
other network fingerprinting tools such as Xprobe2 (Sys-Security Group, 2003), which functions similarly to NMAP in 
an active manner, and p0f (Zalewski, 2004), which is a passive fingerprinting tool that assesses captured network traffic 
instead of actively probing the target. It is intended that upon successful TCP/IP fingerprinting, the personalities of each 
host will be configured to incorporate services, applications, and routing latency. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Effective TCP/IP fingerprinting is an integral part of deceiving the blackhat when performing host discovery. The 
honeyd honeynet implements NMAP’s OS signatures and fingerprints for counteracting network-fingerprinting tools 
like NMAP. Ongoing research has shown that the effectiveness of NMAP fingerprinting has varied both over the wired 
and wireless mediums, and over varying releases of the each software in use. The best possible way of determining the 
best OS emulation in honeyd is to test regularly the NMAP signatures and fingerprints. 
This research reported on the results acquired from NMAP primarily as a comparison between wired and wireless 
NMAP scans to determine where the problems have arisen. It was found the interference of other wireless activity and 
large room space hinders effective physical and data link layer transmission between an attacking machine performing 
the fingerprinting against the honeynet machine. It was then decided to test the fingerprinting in a faraday cage to 
ascertain differences in results. 
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The faraday cage proved more successful results in that 15 OS signatures could be fingerprinted, as opposed to the six 
originally tested. This change was attributed to significant upgrades on the NMAP program itself, from v3.55 to 3.75 in 
addition to the confining space and walls of the faraday, which allowed transmissions to occur faster and without 
interference, resulting in the significantly shorter scanning times. 
The outcomes of this research are that NMAP is a continuingly developing program as are honeynet architectures. 
However, the implementation of NMAP signatures in honeyd is the most significant change that affects the TCP/IP 
fingerprinting ability of the deceptive network. Therefore, effective TCP/IP fingerprinting is more reliant on the 
environment in which it is performed, whether there is interference or a far range for signals to travel, in addition to the 
version of NMAP used. 
A final proposed test is to perform the attacks outside the faraday to determine if honeyd is still able to respond 
effectively where there is the outside interference. This testing may illuminate on the honeynet’s ability to deceive in a 
potentially live and realistic environment. Interference and uncontrolled signals are realistic obstacles for the blackhat 
and are subsequent problems for the defender when attempting to employ deceptive network countermeasure against 
TCP/IP fingerprinting. This can be further verified by inviting guest attackers to penetration test the network and 
determine if these deceptive mechanisms work on a real blackhat! 
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